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Abstract 
This paper aims to estimate the cost of pensions, compensations and foregone 
contributions due to occupational accidents for the main Greek social security 
institution IKA-ETAM. Through this process, conclusions transferable to other 
occupational risk insurance systems are drawn. 
Both prevalence and incidence approach are applied on analytical data for active 
and new occupational accident pensions and compensations of IKA-ETAM for 2007. 
Cost is estimated as the difference of all costs and benefits with and without the 
accident. 
Prevalence approach leads to an estimate of €148,539,548.40 against an estimate 
of €77,707,206.98 with incidence approach. In both approaches, cost of temporary 
disability is estimated at €18,464,021.61 and foregone contributions (opportunity cost) 
account for 27% of total cost. 
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Although wages raised, contribution and compensation rates remained stable and 
accidents decreased for IKA-ETAM contribution payers during last decades, the 
viability of the system is threatened. The reasons identified are a) the increase of the 
average time off-work per accident and b) the backload, due to the large number of 
accidents and pensions in the past.  
Keywords: Occupational Risk Insurance, Prevalence Approach, Incident Approach 
JEL Codes: G22; G32 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Social security systems, especially those directly or indirectly related to 
occupational risk, serve two main goals: fair distribution of relevant costs 
(sometimes in a way to provide incentives) and ensuring enough resources for 
decent provisions to insured individuals when needed. One of the reasons why 
these two goals are not easy to be served together is the temporal dispersion of 
costs. Current contributions aim to cover future and uncertain costs of the 
insured individuals; therefore even if they are fairly distributed among the 
contribution payers (individuals and enterprises), the level of contributions is 
not easy to be defined, as it requires knowledge of future costs, subject to 
uncertain and complex factors, unpredictable in some cases like the one 
examined here. 
The prevailing factor in such cases, at the individual level, is time 
preference (Drummond et al. 2005); therefore pressure is towards the minimum 
possible contributions. In many cases, this pressure was not met at the 
institutional level by certain informed studies of future costs with sensitivity 
analysis. Therefore, contributions were settled to levels that were adequate for 
the present costs, but not adequate to cover the future costs of provisions for 
contribution payers when they need them, either they still contribute or not. 
This paper attempts to illustrate this tendency in the Greek system of 
occupational risk insurance, whose features are characteristic of this situation. 
Due to the lack of a specialized institution for occupational risk insurance, the 
main social security institution for private sector employees IKA-ETAM bears 
the main part of the cost of workplace accidents and diseases, with provisions in 
medical care or in cash and pensions.  
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The vast majority of employees and almost half of the active Greek 
population are insured to IKA-ETAM. The institution is the main pension 
provider and also provides medical care (directly or through provisions in cash), 
rehabilitation and compensation for time off-work due to health impairment. 
There is also a different policy for workplace accidents (they are compensated 
from the first day of absence and there is a different sum of pension due to 
permanent disability if it is due to an occupational accident) but it is not truly 
applied for occupational diseases that are usually treated as “plain diseases”. To 
balance these costs due to occupational accidents, IKA-ETAM settled an 
insurance premium (paid by the employer) equal to 1% of wage, applicable to 
all “non-office” employed workers (Decree 473/1961). Heavy duties are also 
subject to higher premiums both for employers and employees, as they lead to 
early retirement. Table 1 summarizes all compulsory contributions of IKA-
ETAM as percentages of wage: first three categories apply to all workers, 
whereas two last apply to some workers only. An average of 29.15% of wage 
(worker’s and employer’s contribution) applies. 
 
  Table 1: Contributions of IKA-ETAM (% of wage) 
 
 Employee Employer Total 
Sickness medical services 2.15 4.30 6.45 
Sickness provisions in cash 0.40 0.80 1.20 
Pension 6.67 13.33 20.00 
Occupational risk - 1.00 1.00 
Heavy/unhealthy duties 2.20 1.40 3.60 
 
In this paper, the real cost of premature pensions, compensations and 
foregone contributions for IKA-ETAM due to occupational accidents, is 
estimated. Unfortunately, due to lack of data, medical-related (treatment, 
rehabilitation) cost could not be included in the estimation. This is also the case 
for occupational diseases that are also excluded from the analysis. However, 
even if these major items are excluded, some important conclusions for all 
relevant insurance schemes can be drawn. 
The general aspect applied here was to define the economic impact of 
occupational accidents for IKA-ETAM (total cost) as the difference in costs and 
benefits between the situations with and without the accident; i.e. opportunity 
cost is also included. 
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To get a more accurate view of the situation, the calculation of costs took 
place with both approaches available in literature (Van Doorslaer & Bouter 
1990, Freeman et al. 2001, Meerding et al. 2006): prevalence and incidence 
approach. Prevalence approach estimates the costs payable during the year of 
reference for all “active” cases, i.e. the current cost in the year of reference 
attributable to all accidents regardless to when they occurred. In contrast, 
incidence approach estimates all current and future costs (regardless to when 
they are payable) attributable to the accidents that occurred during the year of 
reference.  
In a mature and stable insurance system, these two estimates should ideally 
coincide. However, this is not the case in most systems, either due to changes in 
the course of their reform or due to changes in workplace (employment shifting 
to the “safer” tertiary sector, reinforcement of legislation, improvement in 
technology, etc.) or in medical science (decrease of permanent disabilities or 
temporary disability time). 
 
 
 
  Figure 1: Prevalence and incidence approaches for 2007 
   
Prevalence 
approach 2007   
2008 2007 2006 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Incidence approach 2007 
Accident 2 (2006) 
Accident 1 (2006) 
Accident 3 (2007) 
Accident 4 (2007) 
Accident 5 (2007) 
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2. Methodology 
Raw data from IKA-ETAM for occupational accident pensions (all pensions 
active and new pensions awarded in the year of reference) and temporary 
disability compensations for 2007 were used. Generally, it is assumed that the 
worker will keep working with full insurance until the average retirement age 
(61 for males and 59 for females) if minimum threshold of insurance time 
(4,500 insured days) is completed, or until the completion of 4,500 insured days 
if his/her age is already above the average retirement age; his/her pension is 
estimated according to Table 1A (Appendix). Solidarity benefit “EKAS” 
(estimated according to Table 2.A in Appendix) for pensioners with low income 
is also added when it applies. 
As mentioned above, the cost for IKA-ETAM is here estimated as the 
difference between the expenditure (and foregone benefits) with and without the 
accident. Therefore, the following cases stand: 
Case 1: Death or permanent disability.  
Incidents of this case lead to premature pension and they are examined 
together, because their cost is similar for IKA-ETAM. 
In prevalence approach, the actual value (from accounts) of pensions paid 
(plus EKAS) is summed up for the cases when the worker is not yet entitled for 
normal pension, as in this case pension is absolutely attributable to the accident 
(there would be no pension otherwise). For the rest of the cases (over retirement 
age and with 4,500 insured days completed), the difference between the 
accident pension that the victim gets (from accounts) and normal pension 
(estimated according to Table 1.A in Appendix) that the victim would get 
(including EKAS when applicable), applies. This difference is the pension cost 
attributable to the accident. 
Foregone contributions are also estimated based on the entitlement of 
normal pension. If both requirements (age and insured time) are satisfied, then 
no loss of contributions is assumed (the victim could have retired anyway), 
whereas if only one of them is satisfied, then the annual loss of contributions is 
assumed to be 29.15% (average percentage of contributions) of the daily wage 
of the victim times 300 (annual insured days).  
For incidence approach, methodology estimation for pensions and foregone 
contributions is different. Initially, the age of the victim is subtracted from the 
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average retirement age (with completed 4500 insured days), i.e. when the victim 
would retire had no accident happened, in order to calculate the years while the 
worker will receive pension, whereas he/she would work had the accident not 
happened.  
An annual raise of 3% is assumed for these years. Hence, the foregone 
contributions are estimated (29.15% times the future presumed daily wages). 
Moreover, based on these years, the sum of occupational accident pensions that 
the victim will receive until the year of normal retirement is estimated, i.e. total 
pension + EKAS, times the number of years.   
For the years after retirement, the difference between normal pension and 
occupational accident pension needs to be estimated. In this case, difference is 
negative in many cases, when the victim-worker would retire after many years 
with a normal pension well above the occupational accident pension. Of course, 
the case when a normal pension well above the workplace accident pension is 
already entitled at the time of the accident needs to be removed, as the victim 
will prefer the normal pension; i.e. the accident impairs no cost for IKA-ETAM.  
In order to estimate the duration of the pension, life expectancy at victim’s 
age during the accident (and gender) is used. However, since the pension 
usually keeps being paid to other protected family members, the average extra 
duration of these pensions (estimated at 4.08 years, which is the average extra 
duration from historical data) is added. In other words, it is assumed that the 
pension will keep being paid for 4.08 years after the life expectancy of the 
victim.  
The likelihood that the worker who would be capable for work had the 
accident not happened, will not find employment should also be taken into 
account, as in this case, the worker will not contribute. Therefore, foregone 
contributions are reduced by a percentage of 9%, which is an estimate of the 
unemployment rate for experienced workers (overall unemployment rate is 
higher because it includes the higher unemployment rate of first entrants; 
however workplace accident victims are by definition not first entrants). 
The sum of occupational accident pensions until the age of normal 
retirement and the algebraic sum of pension differences (between normal 
pension and occupational accident pension) after this year, comprise the pension 
cost. 
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In both approaches, all benefits, including EKAS, are included. It has to be 
mentioned that if the pensioner does not receive EKAS, although his/her 
pension is low enough (obviously due to other unrelated income) EKAS is not 
included whatsoever. 
Case 2: Temporary disability 
This sort of disability is almost always completed within one year. 
Therefore, in both approaches (prevalence and incidence), the relevant cost is 
the same and it includes compensations and foregone contributions for the 
period of disability. Compensation cost is calculated simply by adding actual 
value (from accounts) of all compensations paid. For foregone contributions, 
the wage needs to be multiplied with 29.15% contribution rate times the days 
off-work for each case. According to IKA-ETAM regulation, temporal 
disability compensation is 50% of the daily wage plus 16.66% for the period 
under medical treatment and plus 5% for each extra protected person. For the 
first 15 days of absence all sums are halved (the other half is paid by the 
employer).  
Due to the short time of disability there is no discount for unemployment. 
3. Results 
3.1  Prevalence Approach 
In prevalence approach, the total cost of 13,795 active occupational 
accident pensions active currently is €106,417,220.98; however, only 
€12,369,770.14 (1,471 pensions) is about victims that were entitled to normal 
pension. Even in these cases, IKA-ETAM bears a total cost of €2,136,370.94 
due to the difference between their occupational accident pension and the 
normal pension that they would receive had the accident not happened. 
For the rest of 12,324 active pensions the whole pension is a burden for 
IKA-ETAM (there would be no pension had the accident not happened). The 
cost of these pensions is up to €94,047,450.84. Moreover, in these cases the 
pensioner would be in working age and would be working (if not unemployed) 
and paying contributions at 29.15% of his/her wage in average, which sums up 
to €33,891,705.01 annually.  
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The cost of compensations of temporary disability is €12,338,448.29 and 
reflects 606,497 days of compensation resulting to foregone contributions of 
€6,125,573.32. Hence the total cost in prevalence approach is €148,539,548.40. 
 
Table 2: Estimation of cost with prevalence approach 
 
 Permanent 
disability – death 
Temporary 
disability 
Total 
Pensions - Compensations 96,183,821.78 12,338,448.29 108,522,270.07 
Foregone contributions 33,891,705.01 6,125,573.32 40,017,278.33 
Total 130,075,526.79 18,464,021.61 148,539,548.40 
 
 
3.2   Incidence Approach 
296 new pensions were awarded for 2007 with a total annual cost of 
€2,329,707, out of which 71 were disability pensions, 3 were age pensions and 
rest 222 were death pensions, of which 95 for fatal accidents and 127 were 
occupational accident pensions that shift beneficiary (next of kin) after the death 
(not directly related to the occupational accident) of the victim.  
Of these pensions, in 76 cases the victim had fulfilled minimum 
requirements for normal pension; therefore extra pension due to occupational 
accidents is €151,255 for 2007. In rest 220 cases the whole pension is an extra 
burden for IKA-ETAM with a total annual cost of €2,178,452.21. In these cases 
there are also foregone contributions of €15,066,986.15 for the rest of the 
potential working years of the victims (discounted for an unemployment rate of 
9%). 
To sum up, the cost of future pensions (cost of pension up to the year of 
normal pension entitlement plus the difference from normal pension for the rest 
of the expected duration of the pension) is estimated at €44,176,199.22.  
As mentioned before, the cost of compensations for temporary disability 
equals to the cost estimate of the previous approach. Therefore the total cost 
estimate is €77,707,206.98. 
 
Table 3: Estimation of cost with incidence approach 
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 Permanent disability 
– death 
Temporary 
disability 
Total 
Pensions - Compensations 44,176,199.22 12,338,448.29 56,514,647.51 
Foregone contributions 15,066,986.15 6,125,573.32 21,192,559.47 
Total 59,243,185.38 18,464,021.61 77,707,206.98 
 
4. Discussion 
In the period 1983-2007, Greece saw a continuous development: Gross 
Domestic Product (Purchasing Power Parity) raised by 180%, wages (subject to 
large inflation) were raised about 3 times (whereas the contribution rates of 
Table 1 remained stable) and employment increased by 27.4%. Meanwhile, 
number of accidents of IKA-ETAM drop by 67%. In other words, contributions 
were raising (more workers, higher wages, stable rates) while accidents were 
falling. This should normally lead to a surplus in the occupational risk insurance 
scheme; however this was not the case, as unfortunately happens in most 
insurance funds. 
The reason behind this seemingly paradox can be illustrated based on the 
findings of previous Paragraphs. This illustration is easier for temporary 
disability, as in this case temporal dispersion of costs does not apply. Therefore, 
annual contributions should be equal or more than annual compensations, i.e. 
 
n∙300∙W1∙r ≥ n∙p1∙d1∙W1∙c1, where: 
 
300 is the number of insured days per year 
n is the number of insured workers 
W is the average daily wage 
r is the contribution rate (stable) 
p is the accident probability per worker for accidents with temporary 
disability  (i.e. number of accidents per number of workers) 
d is the average duration (days) off-work due to an accident 
c is the compensation rate paid per day as a percentage of W 
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One first conclusion is that the number of insured workers (employment) 
and level of wages are irrelevant as both contributions and compensations are 
directly proportionate to them. Therefore this relation turns to:300∙r ≥ p1∙d1∙c1, 
Applying this to a posterior time, 300∙r ≥ p2∙d2∙c2. 
To keep viable, p2∙d2∙c2≤ p1∙d1∙c1, or (p1/p2)∙(d1/d2)∙(c1/c2)≥1. 
 
As shown in Table 3.A (Appendix) the ratio of accidents between 1983 and 
2006 is 3.02, which (combined with the increase of 27.4% in working 
population) makes a (p1/p2)=3.85. If the average duration per accident kept 
stable, since compensation rates policy kept unchanged, this would lead to a 
certain surplus situation. 
However, as shown in Table 3.A (Appendix), the average number of days 
per accident have increased from 20.71 to 37.8, i.e. d1/d2= 0.55. Although this 
change would not overcome the ratio of (p1/p2)=3.85 itself, it also has a hidden 
effect. As mentioned above, compensation paid by IKA-ETAM for first 15 days 
is the half of the normal compensation. Therefore, when average compensated 
days per accident increase, the average cost will also increase. For example, 
20.71 days account for (15/2)+5.71=13.21 full daily compensations, whereas 
37.8 days account for (15/2)+22.8=30.5 full daily compensations. In other 
words, although compensation rates policy remained stable, c1/c2=0.43. This is 
also obvious from the average daily compensation per accident, which rose up 
almost 7 times (Table 3.A Appendix), whereas wages rose 3 times. The rest 
reflects the higher cost internalization for IKA-ETAM due to the higher average 
duration off-work  
Although it is not easy to explain this large increase of days of absence per 
accident, it has to be emphasized that a similar trend also applies to some 
European countries (e.g. Sweden, France, Slovakia) but not to others (e.g. 
Finland, Belgium, Italy, Poland, Slovenia). However, in all countries with 
available data (LABORSTA), at least a slight increase in days per accident 
applies.  
To sum up (p1/p2)∙(d1/d2)∙(c1/c2)= 0.91, which is lower than 1 that is required 
for a viable system. Concluding, as compensation and contribution are both 
proportionate to wage and number of days per accident increase, compensations 
are growing faster than contributions. 
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In the present estimation, the cost due to temporary disability accounts for 
12.43% of the total cost (prevalence approach), which is comparable to the 
estimated cost in similar studies (10% Santana et al. 2006, 9.6% Leigh et al. 
1997) in other countries. Therefore, the large part of costs falls to the permanent 
disability.  
For permanent disability, the situation is not as easy to show analytically 
due to time dispersion of costs (here increase in employment and wages can be 
beneficial for the viability of the system), however some effects in the same 
direction will be shown. 
Prevalence approach leads to a much higher estimate (almost double) than 
the incidence approach; i.e. the cost of new accidents is half than the cost of 
previous accidents.  
There are 13,795 active pensions, whereas new occupational accident 
pensions for 2007 there were only 166 (the rest of the 296 were already existing 
pensions that shifted to another beneficiary), which accounts for a rate of 1:83. 
In other words, there are 83 times more occupational accident pensions in the 
system than the new pensions of 2007. This fact reflects that the system is back 
loaded, i.e. already overloaded with pensions of previous years, when the 
accidents were much more, as shown in Table 3.A (Appendix). This 
overwhelming cost cannot be balanced only by the annual contributions that are 
supposed to compensate the future cost of the accidents of the current year 
(according to incidence approach), i.e. the annual cost of 166 pensions, times 
the expected duration of them, which is the average life expectancy of current 
pensioners plus the extra duration of the pension (next of kin), i.e. 
18.94+4.08=23.2 years. In other words, the system should normally support 
active pensions of 23.2 years like 2007, but it has to support pensions of 83 
years.  
Obviously, the annual cost of supporting the system (paying pensions and 
compensations) was much lower in previous years and it keeps rising 
incrementally as new pensions are added. This incremental cost was not 
sufficiently charged into the system through higher compensations in advance, 
i.e. while today’s pensioners were still contributing.   
Another conclusion of this paper is that opportunity cost (foregone 
contributions) is also an important parameter and it accounts for about 27% in 
both approaches. It is a hidden cost that increases significantly the total cost 
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when taken into account. However, this hidden cost is also rarely taken into 
account, especially in advance. 
To sum up, temporal dispersion of costs, as well as hidden costs can easily 
lead to underestimation of the proper contribution rates and subsequently to 
inefficiency as the annual payable cost rises incrementally. Although the 
number of occupational accidents keeps decreasing in most countries due to a 
number of systematic reasons mentioned before, this will not be necessarily 
beneficial for the occupational risk insurance system if not properly designed. 
In the case of IKA-ETAM examined here, reported accidents kept falling in a 
period of continuous growth and increase of employment and wages. However, 
although the contribution rates were kept stable, this was not beneficial for the 
system, as backload and reverse trends (increase of wages also increased 
compensations and pensions) overcame the benefits. 
Unfortunately, based on the existing data it was not possible to estimate the 
cost of medical treatment, rehabilitation, sequential diseases, etc., as well as the 
cost for occupational diseases, since IKA-ETAM truly burdens this cost, even 
under the umbrella of “plain disease”. Although no comparisons between 
different countries and insurance schemes can be performed, to indicate order of 
magnitude, the cost of medical treatment has been estimated at about 20% 
(Corso et al. 2006), 29.6% (Miller & Galbraith 1995), 34% (Leigh et al. 1997), 
36% (Leigh et al. 2001) until 41.5% (Shalini 2009) of the total cost of accidents 
(in a review of studies by Andreoni, 1986 the respective values are between 
21% and 42%). 
5. Conclusion 
This study attempted to estimate the cost of pensions, compensations and 
foregone contributions due to occupational accidents for IKA-ETAM. The main 
conclusion, which is also reflected in the different cost estimation of different 
approaches (prevalence approach shows a cost twice as much as incidence 
approach) is that despite the reduction of accidents, the system is backloaded, 
which inevitable leads to inefficiency, as the cost is incrementally rising by new 
pensions and compensations. 
This intensifies the shifting of costs to the society (tax payers, insured 
workers and new “innocent” enterprises) either directly (when a separate 
occupational risk insurance scheme exists) or indirectly (through social security, 
when there is no separate occupational risk insurance scheme), which is a 
counter-incentive for enterprises that in some cases can exceed existing 
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incentives, such as variable insurance rates (the portion is reducing but the 
whole is growing faster). 
 
REFERENCES 
Andreoni, D., (1986). The Cost of Occupational Accidents and Diseases. Occupational Safety and 
Health Diseases. 363.11 ILO OSHS 54. International Labour Office, Geneva. 
Corso, P., Finkelstein, E., Miller T., Fiebelkorn, I., Zaloshnja, E., (2006). Incidence and lifetime 
costs of injuries in the United States. Injury Prevention 12, 212-218. 
Drummond, M.F., O’Brien, B.J., Stoddart, G.L., Torrance, G. W., (2005). Methods for the 
Economic Evaluation of Health Care Programmes. Third Edition, Oxford University Press 
Inc., New York. 
Freeman, K., LaFleur, B.J., Booth, J., Doyle, E.J. & Pugh, W.M., (2001). Why Federal Agencies 
should Estimate their Long-Term Occupational Injury and Illness Costs. Journal of Safety 
Research 32: 277-287. 
IKA, (2008). ‘IKA-ETAM Accidents at work report for the year 2006’. Available from: 
http://www.ika.gr/gr/infopages/stats/stat_report_results2.cfm. 
Leigh, J.P., Markowitz, S.B., Fahs, M., Shin, C., Landrigan, P.J., (1997). Occupational injury and 
illness in the United States: estimates of costs, morbidity and mortality. Archives of 
International Medicine 157, 1557 – 1568. 
Leigh, J.P., McCurdy, A. & Schenker, M.B., (2001). Costs of Occupational injuries in 
Agriculture. Public Health Reports 116 (3) :235-248. 
Meerding, W.J., Mulder, S., van Beeck, E.F., (2006). Incidence and costs of injuries in The 
Netherlands. European Journal of Public Health 16 (3): 271-277. 
Miller, T.R., Galbraith, M., (1995). Estimating the costs of occupational injury in the United 
States. Accident Analysis and Prevention 27 (6) : 741-747. 
Santana, V.S., Araujo-Filho, J.B., Albuquerque-Oliveira, P.R., Barbosa-Branco, A. (2006). 
Occupational Accidents: Social insurance costs and work days lost. Revue Saude Publica 40 
(6):2-8. 
Van Doorslaer, E.,  Bouter, L., (1990). Assessing the economic burden of injuries due to 
accidents: methodological problems illustrated with some examples from the literature. 
Health Policy 14:253-265. 
 
